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I. Introduction 
Corporations engage in business transactions for a wide 
variety of reasons. Doing so purely to obtain an illegitimate tax 
advantage, however, is not permissible.1 Generally, business 
transactions “must serve a bona fide business purpose (i.e., not 
just . . . tax avoidance [purposes]) to qualify for beneficial tax 
treatment.”2 To determine whether a legitimate business purpose 
exists, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts look to 
the economic substance doctrine.3 The doctrine “is a common-law 
rule that allows courts to question the validity of a transaction and 
deny taxpayers benefits to which [they] are technically entitled 
under the Code if the transaction at issue lacks ‘economic 
substance.’”4 
A circuit split has emerged, however, and the application of 
this doctrine has become more complicated, possibly affecting 
hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign tax credits. The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit5 and the Second Circuit,6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (arguing that courts “[seek] to distinguish between structuring a real 
transaction in a particular way to obtain a tax benefit, which is legitimate, and 
creating a transaction to generate a tax benefit, which is illegitimate”). 
 2. Business-Purpose Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 3. See Richard M. Lipton, “Codification” of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine—Much Ado About Nothing, SS017 ALI-ABA 1035, 1035 (2010) 
[hereinafter Lipton, “Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine] 
(describing “[t]he economic substance doctrine as one of the long standing 
judicial doctrines”). 
 4. Id. (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468–70 (1935)). 
 5. See generally Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 6. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. United States, 801 F.3d 104, 117–18 
(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1377 (2016) (expressly declining to follow 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ prior reasoning). 
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on the one hand, and the Fifth7 and Eighth8 Circuits, on the other, 
disagree about how to apply the objective prong of the economic 
substance doctrine to disputed transactions.9 Specifically, the 
issue is whether foreign income taxes should be included in the 
calculation of pre-tax profits when determining if a transaction 
has meaningfully altered the taxpayer’s economic position.10 
Resolving this issue is crucial, because the economic substance 
doctrine functions as the gatekeeper for foreign tax credits. 
Depending on the courts’ application of the doctrine, taxpayers 
may be awarded—or denied—hundreds of millions of dollars in 
foreign tax credits. A split amongst the courts leads to 
uncertainty for both taxpayers and the government alike. 
This Note attempts to resolve this split by suggesting that, 
when calculating pre-tax profits under the objective prong of the 
economic substance doctrine, foreign income taxes should be 
treated as expenses. Part II examines the economic substance 
doctrine itself. In this regard, the focus is on the history and 
origin, modern conception and use, and recent clarification of the 
doctrine into the Internal Revenue Code.11 Part III focuses on the 
circuit split. The cases are discussed chronologically, beginning 
with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, followed by the Federal and 
Second Circuits. The discussion puts particular emphasis on the 
underlying transactions that give rise to the disputes, and the 
objective prong of the doctrine.12 Part IV discusses pending 
litigation in other jurisdictions, which may have an impact on the 
circuit split. Particularly, this Part focuses on the recent opinion 
by the First Circuit as a case study and current federal district 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See generally Compaq Comput. Corp. v. United States, 277 F.3d 778 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
 8. See generally IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 9. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 113 (inquiring whether the 
taxpayer’s transaction had a meaningful chance to generate a profit). 
 10. See id. at 117–18 (concluding that foreign taxes should be considered 
expenses when calculating pre-tax profits under the objective prong of the 
economic substance doctrine and stating that “both the Compaq and IES courts 
declined to consider the foreign taxes paid and foreign tax credits claimed in 
their economic substance analysis”). 
 11. Infra Part II. 
 12. Infra Part III. 
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court litigation.13 Part V recommends that the circuit split be 
decided in favor of the Federal and Second Circuits’ points of 
view, namely that foreign taxes should be treated as expenses 
when determining the potential for pre-tax profits. The Part 
discusses the reasons for choosing this resolution and the 
legislative, regulatory, and judicial options for resolution.14 Part 
VI concludes by summarizing the arguments, and offering a 
solution for this issue.15 
II. The Economic Substance Doctrine 
To understand the economic substance doctrine, it is 
important to understand in which contexts it applies. Generally, 
a taxpayer’s transaction must comply with “the detailed language 
of a tax statute.”16 However, “at times a court subjects a taxpayer 
to . . . [scrutiny] even though the taxpayer complied with the 
literal language of the tax statute.”17 In such cases, courts may 
look past the exact language of a statute.18 Courts do so by 
applying a common law doctrine that has come to be known as 
the economic substance doctrine. Yet, the application of the 
doctrine has proven not to be straightforward. 
A. History and Modern Use of the Economic Substance Doctrine 
The history of the economic substance doctrine is difficult to 
delineate.19 Other doctrines that courts developed around the 
same time are the business purpose doctrine20 and the sham 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Infra Part IV. 
 14. Infra Part V. 
 15. Infra Part VI. 
 16. See William J. Kolarik II & Steven N.J. Wlodychak, The Economic 
Substance Doctrine in Federal and State Legislation, 67 TAX LAW. 715, 721 
(2014) (requiring a taxpayer to determine, as a preliminary matter, whether an 
“activity falls within or without the statute’s text”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. (focusing instead on the legislative intent and “the statute’s 
underlying justification”). 
 19. See id. at 723 (stating that the economic substance doctrine developed 
simultaneously with other tax avoidance doctrines). 
 20. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 
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transaction doctrine.21 On the one hand, the business purpose 
doctrine looks into the subjective intent of the taxpayer, 
providing “that a tax statute will not be applied to a transaction 
unless the transaction serves some business purpose, other than 
tax avoidance.”22 On the other hand, the sham transaction 
doctrine focuses on the objective character of the transaction, 
namely, inter alia, whether a transaction had a reasonable 
chance for profits.23  
Arguably, the economic substance doctrine incorporates these 
two doctrines.24 This has prompted commentators to note that 
these concepts are “often commingled” and used 
interchangeably.25 Nevertheless, the business purpose doctrine, 
the sham transaction, and the economic substance doctrine all 
originated from the case Helvering v. Gregory26 in 1934.27 
In Gregory, Judge Learned Hand laid the foundation for 
establishing the economic substance doctrine as it exists today.28 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Gregory, aimed to eliminate tax consequences 
from the sale of shares of a United Mortgage Corporation (UMC) 
subsidiary, of which she was the sole shareholder.29 To achieve 
                                                                                                                 
(11th Cir. 2001) (stating that a business purpose exists “as long as it figures in a 
bona fide, profi-seeking business”). 
 21. See id. (noting that the sham doctrine is synonymous with the economic 
substance doctrine, “provid[ing] that a transaction ceases to merit tax respect 
when it has no economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits”). 
 22. Noöl B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 21 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 23. See Timothy H. Gillis & Ann L. Holley, States Apply the Federal Sham 
Transaction Doctrine to Intangibles Holding Companies, 98 J. TAX’N 173, 176 
(2003) (noting that this is often used interchangeably with the term “economic 
substance” (quoting Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 96 (4th 
Cir. 1985))). 
 24. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (combining the two doctrines 
by using the word “and” to express that both elements are needed). 
 25. See Gillis & Holley, supra note 23, at 176 (describing the doctrines and 
providing examples of cases in which the doctrines were applied). 
 26. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 27. See id. at 810–11 (disallowing tax exemption for the taxpayer’s business 
reorganization, made for purely tax reasons, because Congress did not intend for 
taxpayers to use the underlying statutory provision in such a way). 
 28. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 722, 724 (stating that 
Judge Hand developed the doctrine “in his [struggle] to find a workable solution 
to the problem of tax avoidance”). 
 29. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810 (“In 1928 it became possible to sell 
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this, Mrs. Gregory established another corporation through which 
she would be able to avoid the tax through corporate 
reorganization.30  
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected Mrs. 
Gregory’s tax structure, “determining that the transaction lacked 
substance and was entered into solely for tax avoidance 
purposes.”31 Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Hand agreed 
with the Commissioner, concluding that Mrs. Gregory entered 
into the reorganization for no other reason but to avoid her 
taxes.32 Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s decision, “finding that Mrs. Gregory’s transaction was in 
pursuance of a plan to reduce her taxes which ‘[had] no business 
purpose,’ which it determined to be the prerequisite for corporate 
reorganizations.”33 Arguably, Gregory marks the first foray into 
what would eventually evolve into part of the economic substance 
doctrine.34 Yet, the doctrine’s development progressed slowly. 
More than twenty years later, Judge Hand issued a 
dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Commissioner,35 which provided a 
more comprehensive formulation of the doctrine.36 In Gilbert, the 
Second Circuit determined whether a shareholder advance should 
be treated as a loan or a capital contribution.37 The plaintiffs, 
Benjamin and Madeline Gilbert, were both involved in Gilbor, 
                                                                                                                 
the . . . shares . . . but if this had been done directly, [UMC] would have been 
obliged to pay a normal tax on the resulting gain, and . . . a surtax would have 
been assessed against [Gregory] personally [for the dividends paid from the 
sale].”). 
 30. See id. at 810 (providing a detailed description of the exact steps and 
tax code provisions at issue); see also Monica D. Armstrong, OMG! ESD 
Codified!: The Overreaction to Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 
9 FLA. A&M UNIV. L. REV. 113, 118–20 (2013) (same). 
 31. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 120. 
 32. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810 (“To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not 
one of the transactions contemplated as corporate ‘reorganizations.’”). 
 33. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 121 (quoting Gregory v. Helvering, 293 
U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935)). 
 34. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935) (describing what 
would later become the subjective prong—the business purpose inquiry). 
 35. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 36. See id. at 411 (Hand, J., dissenting) (noting the need for an objective 
inquiry into the transaction, and not merely the intent of the taxpayer). 
 37. See id. at 400 (dealing with the specific question of which principle to 
apply to adequately answer the issue). 
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Inc. (Gilbor), which had been involved in numerous unsuccessful 
business ventures.38 Due to these unsuccessful ventures, the 
Gilberts made additional investments into Gilbor “that were 
structured as loans.”39 Subsequently, Gilbor liquidated and the 
Gilberts “claimed bad debt deductions on their 1948 joint income 
tax return.”40 
The Commissioner denied the Gilberts’ deductions, arguing 
that the loans were in fact capital contributions, which would not 
have given rise to bad debt deductions.41 The Tax Court agreed 
and the Gilberts appealed to the Second Circuit.42 While the 
majority decided not to rule and remanded the case for further 
proceedings, Judge Hand found strong words in favor of a 
substantive approach for analyzing the transaction.43 He argued 
that not only must a taxpayer’s business purpose be legitimate and 
within the framework of the statute at issue, it must also 
“appreciably affect his beneficial interest.”44 This marked one of 
the first references to both of the factors of the economic substance 
doctrine up to that date. It would be another few years before the 
next development on the economic substance doctrine occurred. 
In 1960, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted 
Judge Hand’s approach from Gilbert in Knetsch v. United States.45 
The case “involve[d] . . . classic . . . tax arbitrage.”46 Knetsch 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 736 (noting that 
although only Benjamin Gilbert was a shareholder in Gilbor and Madeline was 
not, she was still strongly involved in the company). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 402 (ruling that the Gilberts’ contributions 
were not “bona fide loans” and even though Madeline’s contributions were loans, 
they were not within her trade or business). 
 42. Id. at 410. 
 43. See id. at 410–12 (providing an inquiry into the taxpayer’s subjective 
intent as well as the objective circumstances surrounding the transactions). 
 44. See id. at 411 (concluding that if a taxpayer’s transaction does not 
fulfill these requirements, the tax authorities may disregard the transaction, as 
it could not conceivably be the purpose of the tax code to allow taxpayers to 
“escape from the liabilities that it sought to impose”).  
 45. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (finding that 
“Kentsch’s [sic] transaction with the insurance company did ‘not appreciably 
affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax’” (quoting Gilbert v. 
Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting))). 
 46. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 744. 
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involved complicated transactions concerning debt-financed 
single-premium annuities.47 In 1953, the plaintiff, Mr. Knetsch 
purchased such an annuity from Sam Houston Life Insurance 
Company.48 However, “the Service discovered that Sam 
Houston . . . was marketing the . . . annuity transactions as a tax 
shelter strategy and began challenging the transactions.”49 Due 
to a circuit split on the issue, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.50 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, adopted Judge 
Hand’s approach set forth in Gilbert.51 He concluded that “there 
was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this 
transaction beyond a tax deduction.”52 While Justice Brennan 
explicitly referred to what was arguably the objective economic 
substance component, his analysis into the taxpayer’s business 
purpose was rather implicit.53 After discussing the individual 
steps, Justice Brennan concluded that Knetsch’s transaction was 
not aligned with the purpose of the statute and that “the 
transaction was a sham.”54  
The cases up to this point constitute the basis for what would 
become today’s economic substance doctrine. Judge Hand’s 
pursuit to combat tax avoidance schemes in Gregory and Gilbert 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362 (involving a series of transactions 
surrounding a 30-year maturity deferred annuity savings bond). For the 
purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to discuss the detailed steps of these 
transactions. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 744 (providing a 
step-by-step account of the transactions a taxpayer would enter into to obtain 
the desired tax benefits). 
 48. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362 (“[T]he insurance company sold Knetsch 
ten 30-year maturity deferred annuity savings bonds, each in the face amount of 
$400,000 . . . .”). 
 49. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 745. 
 50. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362 (aiming to resolve a split between the 
Ninth and Fifth Circuits). 
 51. See id. at 366 (“Plainly, therefore, [the] transaction with the insurance 
company did ‘not appreciably affect [Knetsch’s] beneficial interest except to 
reduce his tax . . . .’” (quoting Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 
1957) (Hand, J., dissenting))). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 365–66 (engaging in an analysis of “what was done here,” 
namely Knetsch’s intention to generate large insurance payouts). 
 54. See id. (agreeing with the trial court that Knetsch did not “intend” to be 
indebted to Sam Houston Insurance, but rather was only focused on producing 
favorable tax consequences). 
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led him to conclude that it was necessary to examine, not only the 
taxpayer’s mind, but also the transaction itself.55 Eventually, the 
Supreme Court agreed, and in Knetsch stated: “[T]hrough its 
adoption of Judge Hand’s Gilbert test, place[d] the economic 
substance doctrine in the income tax common law.”56 However, 
the economic substance doctrine still did not have a concise 
definition. This changed with Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.57 
Some commentators regard Frank Lyon as the most 
important case in the development of the economic substance 
doctrine.58 The case concerned the Frank Lyon Company, a 
corporation that attempted to enter into a sale-leaseback 
transaction59 with the Worthen Bank & Trust Company 
(Worthen).60 Additionally, “Frank Lyon was Lyon’s majority 
shareholder and board chairman; [and] he also served on 
Worthen’s board.”61 Worthen planned to construct a new bank 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See supra notes 19–49 and accompanying text (describing the 
individual elements of the doctrine).  
 56. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 745. 
 57. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582–84 (1978) 
(emphasizing both the taxpayer’s motivation and the economic significance of 
the transaction for the taxpayer’s business). 
 58. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 746 (arguing that it was 
the case in which the economic substance doctrine was formally adopted); Allen 
D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-Form 
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 701 (2003) (noting that 
Frank Lyon marked the last case in which the Supreme Court applied a 
substance-over-form analysis to the merits of a case); Philip Sancilio, Note, 
Clarifying (or Is It Codifying?) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions, 
Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 144 (2013) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s formulation of the economic substance doctrine 
as its “final (at least as far as the Court was concerned) and distinctive form”). 
 59. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561 (stating that “petitioner took title to 
the building and leased it back to the bank for long-term use”). For a detailed 
description of sale-leaseback transactions and their application, see generally 
TERREL G. BRESSLER & TYLER C. WILLIBRAND, SALE-LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS: A 
FINANCING ALTERNATIVE FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES (2011), 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/sale-leaseback-transactions-financing-alternative-
middle-market-companies.pdf. 
 60. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563 (noting that Worthen was part of the 
Federal Reserve System, and was thus subject to the appropriate regulations 
applicable to the banks belonging to the system); Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra 
note 16, at 747 (describing the transaction between the two entities as a 
“financing transaction”). 
 61. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563. 
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building to replace the existing building, but was unable to do so 
due to the Federal Reserve regulations.62 Instead, Worthen 
devised a plan to enter into a sale-leaseback transaction, which 
the State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System 
ultimately approved.63 Worthen—following the third-party 
bidding process and the successful securing of financing from a 
third-party insurance company—entered into a sale-leaseback 
agreement with Frank Lyon Company.64 Subsequently, “Worthen 
agreed to sell the building to the Frank Lyon Company piece by 
piece as Worthen constructed the building for a total price not to 
exceed $7.6[4] million.”65 Because the sale price exceeded the 
financing amount by $500,000, the difference “was effectively an 
investment in the building by Frank Lyon Company.”66  
On Frank Lyon Company’s federal tax return following the 
completion of the building, the company sought to deduct one 
month of depreciation on the building, interest on the 
construction loan, and various legal and other expenses connected 
to the transactions.67 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed 
the deductions, stating that because the Frank Lyon Company 
did not own the building, it was not entitled to claim these tax 
benefits.68 The district court disagreed with the Internal Revenue 
Service, reasoning that “the legal intent of the parties had been to 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See id. at 564 (elaborating that “[a]pplicable statutes or regulations 
of . . . the Federal Reserve System required Worthen . . . to obtain prior 
permission for the investment in banking premises,” which the Federal Reserve 
would not approve).  
 63. See id. at 565 (requiring that “Worthen possess an option to purchase 
the leased property at the end of the 15th year of the lease at a set price, 
and . . . that the building be owned by an independent third party”). Although 
the price was not to exceed $7.64 million, the building ended up costing over $10 
million. Id. at 569. 
 64. See id. (noting that the financing that Worthen obtained amounted to 
$7.14 million).  
 65. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 748 (describing the sale 
as a series of transactions to be executed over the duration of the construction). 
 66. See id. (receiving in addition six percent interest on the value of the 
investment). 
 67. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 568 (1978). 
 68. See id. (“All this resulted in a total increase of $497,219.18 over Lyon’s 
reported income for 1969, and a deficiency in Lyon’s federal income tax for that 
year in the amount of $236,596.36. The Commissioner assessed that amount, 
together with interest of $43,790.84, for a total of $280,387.20.”). 
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create a bona fide sale-and-leaseback in accordance with the form 
and language of the documents evidencing the transactions.”69  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision, following the IRS’s line of reasoning.70 Analogizing the 
ownership for tax purposes to “a bundle of sticks,” the court 
stated that the Frank Lyon Company “totes an empty bundle of 
ownership sticks.”71 The court of appeals concluded that Lyon’s 
only economic advantage was income tax savings.72 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision, upholding the deductions.73 The majority, for 
which Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion, “engaged in a 
two-step analysis similar to the Gilbert analysis.”74 The majority 
reasoned that the appropriate analysis was whether “there is a 
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance that 
is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, 
that is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and that is 
not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features to which meaningless 
labels are attached.”75 
Applying this test, Justice Blackmun concluded that this was 
not the case because: “Lyon is not a corporation with no purpose 
other than to hold title to the bank building,”76 meaning that the 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 569. 
 70. See id. at 570 (claiming “that Lyon was not the true owner of the 
building and therefore was not entitled to the claimed deductions”). 
 71. Id. at 570. 
 72. See id. at 572 (“In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens which [Lyon] 
has incurred with respect to the Worthen building are simply too insubstantial 
to establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes.”). 
 73. See id. at 583 (finding “a genuine multiple-party transaction with 
economic substance”). 
 74. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 749. 
 75. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) 
(emphasis added); see also Sancilio, supra note 58, at 144 (describing the 
Supreme Court’s formulation of the doctrine a “negative” one); Thomas C. Vanik 
Jr., Torpedoing a Transaction: Economic Substance Versus Other Tax Doctrines 
and the Application of the Strict Liability Penalty, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 109, 115 
(2015) (marking this phrasing as the moment when “[t]he business purpose 
doctrine and economic substance principle were ultimately combined into what 
has become known as the ‘economic substance doctrine’”). 
 76. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561. 
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parties’ “collective actions created a sale-leaseback for nontax 
purposes.”77 
From a conceptual perspective, Frank Lyon did not alter 
the economic substance doctrine much.78 It was the first time, 
however, in which a court described the test in a conjunctive 
manner, laying out the elements in their entirety.79 Thus, 
based on Frank Lyon, a transaction has economic substance, 
provided it passes a two-prong inquiry: “Was the taxpayer 
motivated by no business purpose (other than getting tax 
benefits) in entering into the transaction? . . . [And] [d]id the 
transaction have objective economic substance, i.e., was there a 
reasonable possibility of a profit?”80  
Following Frank Lyon, “lower courts drew on the Supreme 
Court precedent to formulate many more or less divergent 
versions of the economic substance doctrine.”81 While all courts 
used the doctrine to one extent or another, the application 
differed considerably, creating three basic schools of 
application: disjunctive,82 conjunctive,83 and the so-called 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 16, at 750. 
 78. See id. (arguing that the methodology of the doctrine, namely looking at 
the business purpose and objective factors of the transaction, had already been 
established in Gregory, Gilbert, and Knetsch). 
 79. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (using the word “and” to 
combine the subjective and objective element). 
 80. See Paul Raymond, District Court Upholds Interest Deductions and 
Foreign Tax Credits from STARS Transaction, ORANGE CTY. TAX ATT’Y, 
http://octaxlawattorney.com/district-court-upholds-interest-deductions-and-
foreign-tax-credits-from-stars-transaction/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) 
(constituting the subjective prong and the objective prong, respectively (citing 
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978))) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Sancilio, supra note 58, at 144 n.29 (noting that the Supreme Court 
never explicitly labeled the prongs as the economic substance doctrine, and that 
other courts have often used the term interchangeably with the term “sham 
doctrine” and other tax avoidance doctrines). 
 82. See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“However, these distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute 
discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors 
both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient 
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”). 
 83. See Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(“To treat a transaction as a sham, court must find that the taxpayer was 
motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering 
the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no 
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“flexible inquiry.”84 The increasing uncertainty and the emerging 
circuit splits prompted Congress to act. 
B. Clarification of the Economic Substance Doctrine 
In 2010, “[a]s part of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 . . . Congress enacted new Section 
7701(o), which provides for the ‘codification’ of the economic 
substance doctrine and the addition of substantial penalties for 
transactions that are found to lack economic substance.”85 This 
“codification” was met with stark resistance.86 As a compromise, 
the section was implemented into the tax code not as a 
“codification,” but rather as a “clarification.”87  
Prior to 2010, courts disagreed about how to apply the 
subjective and objective prongs of the doctrine.88 The 
“clarification” of the economic substance doctrine specified that a 
transaction must satisfy both prongs to have economic 
                                                                                                                 
reasonable possibility of a profit exists.” (emphasis added)). 
 84. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“In our Circuit the test is not a rigid two-step process with discrete 
prongs; rather, we employ a ‘flexible’ analysis where both prongs are factors to 
consider in the overall inquiry into a transaction’s practical economic effects.”). 
 85. Lipton, “Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine, supra note 
3, at 1037. The main impetus for this codification, and especially the new strict 
liability penalties, was to provide for an additional revenue booster to finance 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Initially, the estimated revenue was calculated 
to be $17.5 billion. Id. 
 86. See id. (noting that the administration opposed the codification “out of 
concern that the proposal would reduce the courts’ ability to use the economic 
substance doctrine to address taxpayer abuses”). 
 87. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2012) (describing the subsection as a 
“clarification” in the heading, rather than a “codification”); Lipton, 
“Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1037 (same); 
Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s Choices for Economic 
Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551, 551 n.2 (2013) (arguing that the 
“codification of the economic substance doctrine was among the most 
controversial tax items contained in the health care legislation”). 
 88. Compare Rice’s Toyota World, Inc., 752 F.2d at 96 (allowing an interest 
deduction where the transaction was purely tax motivated but had an element 
of economic substance), with United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 
F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[e]ven if the transaction has 
economic effects, it must be disregarded if it has no business purpose and its 
motive is tax avoidance” (citations omitted)). 
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substance.89 In other words, courts interpret the economic 
substance doctrine as a conjunctive two-part test. This alleviated 
much confusion and disparate treatment, and is arguably in line 
with the original concept of the economic substance doctrine as 
envisioned under Frank Lyon.90  
While this was the main issue Congress addressed in the 
clarification, it was not the only one. In addition to mandating a 
conjunctive analysis, Congress added more elements to the 
clarification.91 For the purposes of this Note, the key clarification 
applies to the treatment of fees and foreign taxes.92 To fully 
understand this subsection, scrutiny of the text of the subsection 
and an analysis of the legislative history is crucial. 
Subsection 7701(o)(2)(B) is split into two sentences; the first 
deals with fees and other transaction expenses, and the second 
deals exclusively with foreign taxes.93  
The first sentence is styled in the form of a command, leaving 
no possibility for deviation.94 Although the second sentence, 
concerning foreign taxes, seems equally definitive at first glance, 
closer examination reveals that it is not.95 The second sentence, 
similarly to the first, stipulates that foreign taxes “shall” be 
treated as expenses.96 Unlike the first sentence, the second 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (stating that a transaction has economic 
substance “only if” the first “and” the second prong are fulfilled). 
 90. Supra notes 75, 79 and accompanying text. 
 91. See generally THOMAS E. TAYLOR, CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE BY THE HEALTH CARE AFFORDABILITY RECONCILIATION ACT 
OF 2010 (2010), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/ 
taxation/Economic%20Substance%20Codification.pdf (listing additional 
elements, including the treatment of state and local taxes, certain financial 
accounting benefits, application to individuals, and a reference to penalties). 
 92. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 93. See id. (“Fees and other transaction expenses shall be taken into 
account as expenses in determining pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A). The 
Secretary shall issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as 
expenses in determining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases.”). 
 94. See id. (using the word “shall” to describe the mandatory nature of the 
clause); Shall, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/shall (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (describing that the word 
“shall” is “used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 95. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2012) (using various qualifiers which 
must be fulfilled before the provision can come into effect).  
 96. Id. 
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sentence only applies once the Secretary of the Treasury issues 
regulations on the matter “in appropriate circumstances.”97 
Neither the subsection itself, nor the notes of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation on the clarification of the economic 
substance doctrine, provide any guidance regarding the term 
“appropriate circumstances,” or which taxes the provision 
specifically covers.98  
From a structural point of view, it is reasonable to assume 
that it was not Congress’s intention to stipulate a rigorous rule 
regarding foreign taxes. Had Congress intended to do so, it could 
have simply included foreign taxes within the first sentence, 
leaving no room for doubt. Yet, Congress chose to separate 
foreign taxes, requiring administrative action limited to certain 
undefined circumstances.99  
While the Joint Committee on Taxation’s General 
Explanation of Tax Legislation does not provide any guidance on 
the term “appropriate circumstances,” it does provide limited 
guidance on the legislative intent behind the clause. In their 
explanation of the clause, the committee notes that “[t]here is no 
intention to restrict the ability of the courts to consider the 
appropriate treatment of foreign taxes in particular cases, as 
under present law.”100 This statement supports a less rigorous 
reading of the second sentence of § 7701(o)(2)(B). As in the 
subsection itself, the legislative intent makes use of the qualifiers 
“in particular cases,” and “under present law.”101 Again, the 
committee provides no guidance on what these two terms entail.  
The most important part of the statement is the intention to 
provide deference to the courts to determine their own treatment 
of foreign taxes when calculating pre-tax profits.102 This phrase 
provides a clear indication that Congress did not intend to take 
authority from the courts regarding the treatment of foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally id.; JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 111TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, JCS–2–11 (Comm. Print. 2011). The author 
was unable to locate any other source discussing the doctrine. 
 99. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 100. JOINT COMM. ON TAX., supra note 98, at 381 n.1047. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. (referring specifically to “the ability of the courts to consider the 
appropriate treatment of foreign taxes”). 
1186 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1171 (2018) 
taxes when calculating pre-tax profits, allowing courts to apply 
their own treatment. 
The practical realities surrounding this clause support this 
reading of the subsection, as well as the legislative intent. The 
Secretary of the Treasury has not issued any such regulation.103 
Thus, based on this ambiguity and administrative inaction, a 
split between the circuits’ treatment of foreign taxes regarding 
the calculation of pre-tax profits remains.104 
III. The Circuit Split: Should Foreign Taxes Be Included in the 
Calculation of Pre-Tax Profits? 
The split between the courts arises from a disagreement over 
the framework of the objective prong of the economic substance 
inquiry.105 Specifically, the issue is whether foreign taxes should 
be included in the calculation of pre-tax profits when determining 
if a transaction has meaningfully altered the taxpayer’s economic 
position.106 On both sides of the split, the issue commonly arises 
in the context of cross-border securities transactions, specifically 
whether these transactions are purely tax motivated.107 As 
mentioned, a resolution to this issue is crucial, as the 
interpretation of the objective prong of the economic substance 
doctrine determines whether taxpayers will receive hundreds of 
millions of dollars in foreign tax credits.108 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 2015 WL 6690397 (2015) (No. 15-572) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari]. The Secretary has not promulgated any regulations as of the date of 
writing this Note. 
 104. See id. (“Absent any prospective regulation on that issue, courts 
continue to apply their own inconsistent rules.”). 
 105. Supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 106. Supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 117 (4th Cir. 
1985) (discussing that economic substance must go beyond a mere tax gain). 
 108. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 103, at 33 (listing various 
cases which concerned a combined total of over a billion dollars in foreign tax 
credits). 
IN OR OUT 1187 
A. The Eighth Circuit: IES Industries, Inc. v. United States 
The Eighth Circuit decision in IES Industries, Inc. v. United 
States109 is chronologically the first decision in the split.110 The 
case revolved around the IRS’s denial of a tax refund to the 
taxpayer, IES.111 The transactions at hand involved American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs).112 Owners of such receipts are 
“entitled to all dividends and capital gains associated with the 
ADR, with those moneys taxable in the home country of the 
foreign corporation.”113 The owner is entitled to the dividend as of 
the “record date.”114 
Generally, the foreign corporation withholds the foreign tax 
due on such dividends before they are transferred to the U.S. 
taxpayer.115 In this case, the applicable withholding rate was 
fifteen percent.116 The result was that “the record owner is 
entitled to a 15% foreign tax credit, a dollar-for-dollar credit 
against U.S. taxes owed.”117 IES used a securities advisor to 
identify corporations to invest in.118 Upon choosing a corporation, 
                                                                                                                 
 109. 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 110. See id. at 350 (publishing the final decision on June 14, 2001). 
Discussing the cases chronologically is crucial, as the cases build upon and 
reference each other. 
 111. See id. at 351 (disallowing the tax refund at both the initial refund and 
district court stage because the transactions were “sham transactions”). 
 112. See id. (“ADRs are publicly traded securities, or receipts, fully 
negotiable in U.S. dollars, that represent shares of a foreign corporation held in 
trust by a U.S. bank.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Record Date, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
recorddate.asp?lgl=no-infinite (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (describing “the cut-off 
date established by a company in order to determine which shareholders are 
eligible to receive a dividend or distribution”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also IES Indus., Inc., 253 F.3d at 351 (noting that the 
record date and the actual payment date may be several weeks apart). 
 115. See IES Indus., Inc., 253 F.3d at 351 (noting that in this case, the 
foreign corporations which paid the tax were situated “in the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and Norway”). 
 116. See id. (“[T]he record owner of the ADR would receive 85% of the 
dividend in cash, but the gross income—100% of the dividend—would be fully 
taxable in the United States.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 352 (noting that the securities firm chose companies which 
had announced a dividend). 
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“IES purchased ADRs with a[n] . . . effective trade date, before 
the record date for the dividend, so that IES was the owner on the 
record date and therefore entitled to be paid the dividend.”119 
Immediately after the purchase, IES sold the ADRs so the 
effective trade date of the sale was after the record date.120 In 
other words, IES bought the stock, including the right to the 
dividends, and immediately sold it without dividends, resulting in 
a capital loss.121 
Despite the capital loss, IES still generated a profit due to 
the dividends.122 This meant “IES retained the dividends, which 
were ordinary income to the company, paid the 15% foreign tax, 
and therefore claimed a 15% foreign tax credit in the United 
States.”123 The IRS, as well as the district court, disallowed the 
foreign tax credit, deductions for half of the foreign tax, and other 
claims.124  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit applied both prongs of the 
economic substance doctrine to determine whether IES’s strategy 
passed muster.125 In the court’s view, a transaction constituted a 
sham if “‘it [was] not motivated by any economic purpose outside 
of tax considerations’ (the business purpose test), and if it ‘is 
without economic substance because no real potential for profit 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. (“The purchase and sale generally took place within hours of 
each other, and sometimes in Amsterdam when the U.S. and European markets 
were closed.”). 
 121. See id. (describing the purchase as “cum-dividend” and the sale as 
“ex-dividend”). 
 122. See id. at 352 (stating that the dividend income exceeded the capital 
loss). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 353 (arguing the transactions were a sham and that they had 
no purpose or effect beyond tax). 
 125. See id. at 353–56 (applying both prongs despite declining to decide 
whether both prongs must be fulfilled to establish economic substance). 
Regarding the subjective prong of the economic substance doctrine, the court 
concluded that the transactions occurred at an arm’s length basis under normal 
market conditions, and that normal market risks were involved. See id. at 355 
(referring to the government’s argument that the transactions were a sham 
because they involved no risk). The court noted that “[t]he legal right of a 
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.” Id. 
(citations omitted). Thus, the court concluded that IES had a legitimate 
business purpose for entering into the ADR transactions. 
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exists’ (the economic substance test).”126 In both instances the 
court stated that the transactions fulfilled the test.127 
The most important aspect of the case appears in the Eighth 
Circuit’s discussion of the objective element of the test—the 
economic substance prong. The government argued that the 
economic benefit of a transaction should be measured based on 
the net dividend, after deducting the foreign tax, rather than the 
gross dividend.128 The result was that “the government 
would . . . regard only 85% of the dividends as income to IES, 
notwithstanding that the IRS treats 100% as income for tax 
purposes.”129 
The Eighth Circuit rejected this view and ruled that the 
economic benefit to IES should be assessed on the basis of gross 
dividends.130 The fact that “IES received only 85% of the dividend 
in cash, is of no consequence to IES’s liability for the tax.”131 
Therefore, IES received an economic benefit from the 
transactions regardless of whether the foreign tax was 
deducted.132 Based on this reasoning, the Eighth Circuit 
dismissed the IRS’s claims, deciding that the transactions 
fulfilled both elements of the economic substance test.133  
                                                                                                                 
 126. See id. at 353 (describing the business purpose test as the subjective 
part, and the economic substance test as the objective part of the greater 
economic substance analysis (quoting Shriver v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 724, 725–26 
(8th Cir. 1990))). 
 127. See id. at 354 (applying a more in-depth review of the facts than the 
district court, the Eighth Circuit noted that “the ADR trades here had both 
economic substance and a business purpose”). 
 128. See id. (noting that under that approach “benefit accrues to IES only if 
it receives the foreign tax credit”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (stating that because IES was the legal owner of the dividends 
on the record date, the entire amount due on that date was considered income). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. (concluding that under this approach the transactions resulted 
in a net profit). 
 133. See id. at 359 (reversing the district court’s findings and remanding for 
further proceedings). 
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B. The Fifth Circuit: Compaq Computer Corporation v. 
Commissioner 
In Compaq Computer Corporation v. Commissioner,134 the 
Fifth Circuit issued the second major decision concerning the 
application of the economic substance doctrine to foreign taxes.135 
The facts of the case are similar to those in the Eighth Circuit 
decision.136 In this case, Compaq engaged in an ADR transaction 
to acquire stock in a Dutch entity.137 Similarly to the transactions 
in IES, Compaq’s gross dividend income and the foreign tax 
credit exceeded the sustained capital losses.138 The Tax Court 
“disallowed the gross dividend income, the foreign tax credit, and 
the capital losses reported by Compaq on its tax return.”139  
The Fifth Circuit also applied the two-part economic 
substance test to determine whether the transaction was a sham 
or had economic substance.140 The court noted that “[t]o treat a 
transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was 
motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax 
benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has 
no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a 
profit exists.”141 This language closely resembles the language in  
                                                                                                                 
 134. 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 135. See id. at 778 (issuing its decision approximately six months after the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision).  
 136. See id. at 783 (noting that the ADR transactions at issue were virtually 
“identical” in terms of structure). 
 137. See id. at 779–80 (using the same securities corporation as IES to 
invest in Royal Dutch Petroleum Company).  
 138. See id. at 780 (amounting to approximately $20.7 million in capital 
losses, $22.5 million in gross dividend income, and $3.4 million in foreign tax 
credits); see also IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 
2001) (noting that the capital losses were offset by the dividends). 
 139. Compaq Comput. Corp., 277 F.3d at 780. 
 140. See id. at 781 (resembling closely the Eighth Circuit’s test, but finding 
its basis in a Fourth Circuit Decision (citing Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985))). 
 141. Id. at 781 (quoting Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 
(4th Cir. 1985)). In terms of the “business purpose” requirement, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the tax court’s argument that Compaq’s transactions were 
motivated purely by tax benefits. See id. at 783 (relying in large parts on the 
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning). The Fifth Circuit focused primarily on the facts that 
Compaq availed itself to the forces of the public market and that low risk is not 
itself indicative of a sham. See id. at 783–84, 786–87 (observing that the 
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the IES opinion.142 
Regarding economic substance, the court stated that 
“[p]re-tax income is pre-tax income regardless of the timing or 
origin of the tax.”143 This meant that the tax that Compaq was 
required to pay in the Netherlands constituted income for U.S. 
tax purposes.144 Thus, “the gross Royal Dutch dividend, not the 
dividend net of Netherlands tax, should have been used to 
compute Compaq’s pre-tax profit.”145  
By including foreign taxes in pre-tax profits, the Fifth Circuit 
expressly declined to follow the Commissioner’s rationale.146 The 
court declined to accept that foreign taxes should be treated as 
expenses for economic profit determinations.147 Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit took an approach identical to that of the Eighth Circuit. It 
is important to note that like the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit 
declined to decide whether the transaction needed to satisfy both 
elements of the economic substance doctrine to satisfy the 
doctrine as a whole.148 However, the court acknowledged that 
other courts do not apply a strict two-step analysis, which set the 
stage for the other shoe to drop.149  
                                                                                                                 
transaction was at arm’s length and that even though it involved a low risk, 
Compaq carried risk nonetheless). 
 142. See IES Indus., Inc., 253 F.3d at 355 (“Applying that test, a transaction 
will be characterized as a sham if ‘it is not motivated by any economic purpose 
outside of tax considerations’ (the business purpose test), and if it ‘is without 
economic substance because no real potential for profit exists’ (the economic 
substance test).”). 
 143. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(“In calculating his United States tax liability, the lender must include in gross 
income . . . the . . . tax paid (on his behalf) by the borrower to the . . . tax 
collector.” (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 163 F.3d 1363, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 
1999))). 
 144. See id. at 784–85 (stating that even the Commissioner agreed that the 
gross, and not the net, dividends need to be reported in the U.S.). 
 145. Id. at 785. 
 146. See id. at 785–86 (arguing that the IRS attempted to “stack the deck” 
against the taxpayer). 
 147. See id. (“To be consistent, the analysis should either count all tax law 
effects or not count any of them.”). 
 148. See id. at 781–82 (stating that because both elements were satisfied in 
this case, no decision was necessary). 
 149. See id. at 781 (“Other courts have said that business purpose and 
reasonable possibility of profit are merely factors to be considered in 
determining whether a transaction is a sham.”). 
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C. The Federal Circuit: 
Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States 
The Federal Circuit provides the first decision that declined 
to follow the holdings of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.150 In the 
case, Branch Banking & Trust Corporation (BB&T) challenged a 
judgment of the Court of Federal Claims on behalf of its 
subsidiary, Salem Financial, Inc.151 The dispute over the refund 
arose from a complicated financial transaction known as a 
Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities (STARS) 
transaction.152 Though the components of these transactions are 
complex, only a rudimentary understanding of their effect is 
necessary for this discussion.153 
Initially, BB&T, a U.S. financial holding company, entered 
into a STARS transaction with Barclays Bank PLC, a United 
Kingdom company.154 The transaction consisted of two 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 944–51, 960 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (discussing in detail the Fifth and Eighth Circuit decisions and 
ultimately distinguishing the case before the court from these two prior 
decisions). 
 151. See id. at 936 (seeking to obtain a refund for “taxes, interest, and 
penalties” which the IRS disallowed—an assessment which the tax court 
subsequently upheld). 
 152. See id. (describing the transaction as a “means of enhancing investment 
yield for large, cash-rich corporations located in the United States by taking 
advantage of differences between the tax systems in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom”). 
 153. The specific mechanics of STARS transactions are difficult to dissect. 
The inner workings of these transactions are outside of the scope of this Note 
and are themselves the topic of much scholarship. For detailed accounts on the 
nuts and bolts of STARS transactions, see, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Comm’r, 
40 T.C. 15 (2013); James A. Beavers, Tax Court Weighs In on STARS 
Transaction, TAX ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2013/apr/taxtrends-april2013-story-
01.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Richard M. Lipton, BNY and AIG—Using Economic Substance to 
Attack Transactions the Courts Do Not Like, 119 J. TAX’N 40 (2013) [hereinafter 
Lipton, BNY and AIG]; Richard M. Lipton, The Stars Continue to Shine—Wells 
Fargo Prevails on Various Motions, 122 J. TAX’N 64 (2015); Peter D. Mills & 
Peter E. Burt, Will the Stars Align for the STARS Transactions?, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (July 29, 2015), https://www.bna.com/stars-align-stars-n17179934045/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 154. See Salem Fin., Inc., 786 F.3d at 936 (promoting the transaction, 
together with KPMG, as a “low cost” financing under which BB&T would obtain 
economic benefits from favorable tax treatment). 
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components—a trust and a loan.155 BB&T created the trust and 
contributed a large amount of “income-generating assets.”156 
BB&T then entered into a loan agreement that “consisted of a 
payment by Barclays of $1.5 billion in cash to the Trust in return 
for subscription to three classes of equity interests in the 
Trust.”157 Yet, even though Barclays held an equity interest in 
the trust, BB&T retained control over the trust at all times.158 To 
create the cross-border element, BB&T appointed a U.K. trustee 
to manage the trust.159 The income generated from the assets 
would be paid to the trust, which would withhold the U.K. taxes, 
followed by a temporary transfer to a Barclays account before 
being transferred directly back to the trust.160 This resulted in “a 
substantial tax benefit for Barclays by allowing it to claim a 
‘trading loss deduction’ under U.K. law.”161 BB&T’s and 
Barclays’s tax benefits also resulted from the so-called “Bx 
payments.”162 These payments “[were] set to be equal to 51 
percent of the U.K. taxes paid by the Trust, which had been paid 
by BB&T and which resulted in the tax benefits obtained by 
Barclays.”163 Together, the transaction created substantial tax 
benefits for both companies.164 
The Federal Circuit used a simplified example to illustrate 
the benefits of the transactions.165 The court stated that “$22 for 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See id. at 937 (describing the trust as the primary vehicle and the loan 
as the mechanism for achieving the tax benefits). The term “Bx payment” is a 
term created by BB&T. 
 156. See id. at 937, 951 (valuing the contributed assets at approximately 
$5.8 billion and noting that these assets in fact created “legitimate income”). 
 157. Id. at 937. 
 158. See id. (noting that “Barclays was contractually obligated to sell” the 
$1.5 billion interest back to BB&T once the transactions concluded, which would 
be categorized as a loan). 
 159. See id. (explaining that the trustee’s U.K. residence triggered the U.K. 
tax liability, which would ultimately lead to the foreign tax credit). 
 160. See id. (creating a “circular movement” of funds between the trust and 
Barclays). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 937–38 (describing the payments as another avenue through 
which BB&T and Barclays reduced their tax liability). 
 163. Id. at 938. 
 164. See id. (amounting, in total, “to foreign tax credits in the amount of 
$498,161,951.00”). 
 165. See id. (framing the tax consequences in terms of “$100 of Trust 
1194 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1171 (2018) 
every $100 of Trust income was set aside for payment of the U.K. 
taxes, leaving the Trust with $78 after the U.K. tax payment,” for 
which it would later receive a tax credit.166 Moreover, because 
Barclays held an equity interest in the Trust, Barclays was also 
subject to U.K. taxation on the same income.167 However, 
Barclays was able to offset the Trust’s tax burden, resulting in an 
effective tax rate of $8 per every $100 of Trust income.168 
The “circular movement” between the Trust and Barclays 
provided an additional tax benefit.169 The result was that 
“Barclays’ $8 U.K. tax liability was then completely offset by the 
$23.40 tax deduction, leaving Barclays with a net tax benefit of 
$15.40.”170 Barclays then added another $3.30 of tax benefits 
based on the Bx payments.171 BB&T received a tax benefit by 
claiming a tax credit for the U.K. tax paid on the Trust income.172 
In total, “BB&T anticipated receiving approximately $44 million 
per year from the STARS Trust transaction in addition to the 
revenue generated by the assets themselves.”173 Yet, the success 
of the STARS transactions depended on the favorable assessment 
by the tax authorities.174 
                                                                                                                 
income”). 
 166. See id. (basing those figures on the twenty-two percent tax rate which 
the U.K. levied on the Trust income). 
 167. See id. (subjecting Barclays to a tax of $30 on every $100 based on the 
30% U.K. corporate tax rate). 
 168. See id. (claiming an “imputation credit” for the $22 of tax already paid 
by the Trust under UK law). 
 169. See id. (moving the remaining $78 of income from the Trust to Barclays 
and back, resulting in a “trading loss” for Barclays for which it was able to claim 
a $23.40 deduction). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (“The net benefit to Barclays, for every $100 in Trust income, 
was thus $7.70, based on U.K. tax credits and deductions (the net tax benefit of 
$15.40 minus the Bx payment of $11, plus the tax benefit of $3.30 attributable 
to the deduction for the Bx payment).”). 
 172. See id. (explaining that BB&T would receive a dollar-for-dollar credit 
for the $22 of taxes paid to the UK, in addition to the $11 BB&T gained through 
the Bx payment). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 939 (acknowledging that both parties knew of these risks, and 
thus included additional agreements under which BB&T agreed to indemnify 
Barclays should the projected profits fail “to match the parties’ expectations”). 
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The Federal Circuit stated that to determine whether BB&T 
should receive the refund, the transaction required an analysis 
under the economic substance doctrine.175 Thus, a cumulative 
inquiry was necessary, namely that the transaction must fulfill 
both the objective and the subjective prongs of the doctrine.176 
The court focused its analysis on the objective prong of the 
doctrine.177 The court examined the economic reality of the 
transaction.178 The inquiry focuses “on whether the taxpayer had 
a ‘reasonable possibility of making a profit from the 
transaction.’”179 The court in Salem Financial, Inc. v. United 
States180 examined three questions in this regard, of which the 
first two provide the basis for the third.181 
First, BB&T disputed the government’s claim that the Bx 
payments were, in fact, rebates of the U.K. tax.182 The court 
rejected BB&T’s argument, stating that the payments were “not 
truly independent.”183 Second, BB&T argued that the Bx 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See id. at 940 (agreeing with the Third and Eleventh Circuit that 
“economic substance is a prerequisite to the application of any Code provision 
allowing deductions” (citations omitted)). 
 176. See id. (arguing that in order to determine whether a transaction was 
genuine or a sham, “the court examines the economic reality and business 
purpose of the transaction” (citing Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 177. Id. at 943. Regarding the subjective prong, the court ultimately 
concluded that the transaction had no bona fide business purpose, because 
BB&T “knew that the transaction revolved solely around a tax benefit because 
Barclays represented the transactions as creating a benefit from the ability of 
both parties to obtain credits for the taxes paid in the Trust.” See id. at 952 
(referring to BB&T’s chief financial officer’s statement describing the expected 
benefit in terms of tax benefits). 
 178. See id. at 943 (framing the question of economic reality as “whether a 
particular transaction or set of transactions meaningfully altered the taxpayer’s 
economic position, apart from their tax consequences” (citing Stobie Creek Invs. 
LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010))). 
 179. Id. (quoting Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 
1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 180. 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 181. Infra notes 182–188 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Salem Fin., Inc., 786 F.3d at 943 (claiming that because the 
payments were “independent of Barclays’ actual receipt of any U.K. tax 
benefits,” they should be treated as income). 
 183. See id. at 943–44 (“BB&T’s ability to benefit economically from the Bx 
payments depended on Barclays’ receipt of its expected tax benefits, which in 
turn depended on the Trust’s U.K. tax payments.”). 
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payments should nevertheless be treated as income.184 The court 
agreed with BB&T, rejecting the government’s argument that the 
payments were merely tax effects because the amounts were 
calculated through a tax-based formula.185 Third, the government 
argued that even if the Bx payments were treated as income, 
BB&T did not generate any profit “absent the foreign tax credit 
because the Bx payments must be offset against the Trust’s U.K. 
taxes.”186 Conversely, BB&T contended that the government 
erred in treating the U.K. taxes as an item of expense rather than 
income.187 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
government, stating that “a transaction’s economic reality, and in 
particular its profit potential, [must be] independent of the 
expected tax benefits.”188 
The court’s reasoning revolved primarily around BB&T’s 
reliance on Compaq and IES.189 Upon examining the facts and 
reasoning of those cases, the Federal Circuit expressly declined to 
follow those holdings.190 Specifically, the court noted that “the 
fact that the transactions produced a net gain to the taxpayer 
after taking both the foreign taxes and the foreign tax credit into 
account says nothing about the economic reality of the 
transactions.”191 Rather, transactions must have real economic 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See id. at 944 (basing its argument on the seminal Supreme Court case, 
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 721, 729 (1929)). 
 185. See id. at 946 (arguing that the government provided no authority to 
support its claim and that the claim was at odds with the principles established 
in Old Colony).  
 186. See id. at 947 (claiming that the “[t]rust transaction produced a net loss 
and therefore lacked economic substance,” because “for every $100 of income 
from the Trust assets, even if BB&T were credited with $11 income in the form 
of the Bx payment, that $11 would have to be offset against BB&T’s $22 U.K. 
tax expense, which would yield a loss of $11”). 
 187. See id. at 947–48 (relying primarily on the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ 
reasoning in Compaq and IES, namely that potential for economic profit must 
be determined based on gross profit). 
 188. See id. at 948–49 (ruling that “[t]he Trust transaction . . . is profitless 
before taking into account BB&T’s expected foreign tax credits”). 
 189. See id. at 947–51 (examining in detail the facts involved and the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits’ reasoning). 
 190. See id. at 948 (holding that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ conclusion 
was incorrect and that the transactions at issue in those cases produced “no real 
economic benefit”). 
 191. See id. (explaining that “all tax shelter transactions produce a gain for 
the taxpayer after the tax effects are taken into account” and that this is the 
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effects apart from both taxes paid and tax credits received.192 
Thus, the transactions had “no realistic prospect of producing a 
profit (apart from the effect of the foreign tax credits).”193 This 
effectively meant that the transaction had no independent 
economic characteristics apart from the tax consequences. 
D. Second Circuit: Bank of New York Mellon Corporation v. 
Commissioner 
The Second Circuit issued another decision rejecting the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuit holdings nearly fifteen years later.194 
The case involved two consolidated appeals.195 The facts of these 
cases are complex, but the essential information is as follows.196 
In the first case on appeal, the American International Group 
(AIG) engaged in six cross-border transactions.197 AIG established 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to facilitate the transactions.198 
Initially, AIG created and funded a foreign SPV.199 Subsequently, 
“AIG . . . sold the SPV’s preferred shares to a foreign lender bank 
and committed to repurchase the preferred shares on a specific 
future date at the original sale price.”200 This meant that the 
SPVs consisted primarily of a small contribution from AIG and 
                                                                                                                 
primary reason why companies are willing to enter into such transactions at 
all). 
 192. See id. at 949 (ensuring such benefits only if “there is a genuine 
multi-party transaction” that has real business considerations (quoting Frank 
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978))). 
 193. See id. at 951 (agreeing with the trial court that “the income ‘from 
BB&T’s preexisting assets cycled through the STARS Trust was not [economic] 
profit from STARS’” (citations omitted)). 
 194. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 104 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 195. See id. at 107 (involving AIG in one case, and the Bank of New York 
Mellon in the other).  
 196. Id. For a detailed description of the two underlying cases, see, e.g., 
Lipton, BNY and AIG, supra note 153, at 41–46. 
 197. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 104 (appealing a denial of a 
tax refund of $306.1 million). 
 198. See id. at 108 (noting that the SPV “borrowed funds at economically 
favorable rates below [market] and invested the funds at rates above [market], 
ostensibly to make a profit”). 
 199. See id. (intending the SPV “to hold and invest funds in a foreign 
country”). 
 200. Id. 
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funds the foreign bank paid for the stock.201 Finally, “[t]he SPV 
then used this capital to purchase investments, earning income 
for which the SPV paid taxes to the relevant foreign authority. 
The SPV then paid most of the net proceeds of this investment 
income to the foreign bank as dividends.”202 
Contrary to the finding of the lower court, AIG claimed the 
transactions had economic substance because AIG expected a 
pre-tax profit.203 However, to generate a pre-tax profit, AIG 
ignored the foreign tax paid by the SPV and the value of AIG’s 
foreign tax credit.204 
In the second case, the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY) 
entered into a STARS transaction offered by Barclays.205 To 
simplify the complicated STARS transaction, the Second Circuit 
provided the following illustration: 
The resulting tax benefits to both BNY and Barclays from 
STARS can be illustrated by tracing a hypothetical $100 of 
trust income through the distribution cycle . . . . Under U.K. 
tax law, Barclays—as owner of [a certain] class [of 
stock] . . . was deemed the owner of almost all of the trust 
income and taxed at the 30% U.K. corporate tax rate, 
obligating it to pay $30 in tax for every $100 of trust income 
($100 x 30%). Barclays would reduce this tax bill, however, by 
claiming a credit for the 22% U.K. tax on the trust, which was 
paid by BNY. Barclays’ tax liability for the trust income was 
thus only $8 ($30–$22). BNY, in turn, would claim a foreign 
tax credit in the United States for the full $22 it had paid in 
U.K. taxes on the trust’s income.206 
Based on these facts, the tax court disregarded the STARS 
transaction for tax purposes, considering foreign taxes paid as an 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. at 109 (noting that the profit was for the life of the 
transactions). 
 204. See id. (“[S]ubtracting only AIG’s operating expenses and obligations to 
foreign banks.”). 
 205. For a detailed description of this highly convoluted transaction, see 
generally Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15 (2013).   
 206. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(citations omitted). 
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expense in determining the economic reality of the 
transactions.207 
After describing the facts of these two cases, the Second 
Circuit set out the applicable law.208 The court considered “1) 
whether the taxpayer had an objectively reasonable expectation 
of profit, apart from tax benefits, from the transaction; and 2) 
whether the taxpayer had a subjective non-tax business purpose 
in entering the transaction.”209 While the Court acknowledged 
that it was not bound by the Internal Revenue Code amendment 
mandating the evaluation of both prongs, it ultimately discussed 
both.210 
Most of the court’s analysis focuses on the objective prong of 
the economic substance test.211 At the heart of the discussion was 
“[t]he question . . . [of] whether, for purposes of the economic 
substance doctrine, foreign taxes should be treated as costs when 
calculating pre-tax profit.”212 Ultimately, the Second Circuit 
decided to follow the Tax Court and Salem.213 The Second Circuit 
quoted the Tax Court, stating that the foreign taxes cannot be 
observed in isolation: “Economically, foreign taxes are the same 
as any other transaction cost. And we cannot find any conclusive 
reason for treating them differently here, especially 
because . . . the foreign taxes giving rise to the foreign tax credits 
                                                                                                                 
 207. See id. at 112 (noting that the transaction also failed under the 
subjective prong). 
 208. See id. at 113–19 (stating that the economic substance doctrine applies 
to foreign tax credit regimes). 
 209. Id. at 115 (citing Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 147–48 (2d Cir. 
1991)).  
 210. See id. at 114 (arguing that the court was not bound because the 
amendment was passed after the facts of the cases occurred). 
 211. See id. at 115–22 (discussing thoroughly the approaches of other courts 
in delineating its own test). The Second Circuit devoted very little of its opinion 
to the subjective prong. See id. at 119–23 (allocating only one paragraph to 
describing the standard and its application to the cases respectively). The 
Second Circuit agreed with the lower courts that the transactions were purely 
tax motivated, concluding that BNY’s transactions “lacked a reasonable 
relationship” to any stated business purpose. See id. at 120–23 (describing 
additionally AIG’s transactions as “tax driven” and “tax based”). 
 212. Id. at 116. 
 213. See id. (“The purpose of calculating pre-tax profit is to discern, as a 
matter of law, whether a transaction meaningfully alters a taxpayer’s economic 
position other than with respect to tax consequences.”). 
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stemmed from economically meaningless activity . . . .”214 In other 
words, the foreign taxes are intrinsically linked to credits they 
create—or, rather, the tax benefit the taxpayer is trying to 
achieve—and are thus taken into account as expenses for the 
calculation of pre-tax profits.  
Not only did the Second Circuit agree with the lower court 
and the Federal Circuit, but it also discussed and subsequently 
declined to follow the Fifth and Eight Circuits.215 The court ruled 
“foreign taxes are economic costs for purposes of the economic 
substance doctrine and thus should be deducted from profit before 
calculating pre-tax profit.”216 Based on this test, the court 
concluded that the transactions in dispute failed the objective 
prong.217 
Based on these four cases, the circuits are split on one 
distinct issue: Should foreign income taxes paid be taken into 
account when calculating pre-tax profits for the purposes of the 
objective prong of the economic substance doctrine? The Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits take the position that foreign taxes should be 
included in calculating pre-tax profits.218 Thus, the possibility for 
pre-tax profit was based on gross revenue, rather than net 
revenue.219 They argued that to decline the taxpayer this 
interpretation was to “stack the deck” against him.220 
The Federal and Second Circuit declined to follow this 
approach.221 The Circuits concluded that foreign taxes are similar 
to any other transaction cost and should not be seen as “income” 
for the purposes of determining pre-tax profits.222 Thus, a clear 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Id. at 117. 
 215. See id. at 118 (concluding that it is appropriate to consider the effect of 
foreign taxes, but not the corresponding credit in assessing pre-tax profit). 
 216. Id. at 119. 
 217. See id. at 120–21 (noting that for AIG’s foreign tax credit “far exceeded” 
the potential for an economic benefit and that BNY’s transaction provided no 
“reasonable opportunity for economic profit”). 
 218. See supra notes 110–149 and accompanying text (concluding that the 
transactions were bona fide). 
 219. Supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that either all, or 
none of the tax benefits should be considered). 
 221. See supra notes 190, 215 and accompanying text (determining that 
foreign taxes should be treated as expenses). 
 222. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (agreeing with the tax court 
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dichotomy exists in the application of the doctrine between the 
four circuits. This split brings uncertainty to the economic 
substance doctrine, and thus a solution is necessary, especially 
considering current and emerging cases on the issue. 
IV. Litigation in Other Jurisdictions 
A. A Case Study: The Recent First Circuit Decision:  
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States 
While the recent First Circuit decision223 would be 
adequately placed within Part III of this Note dealing with the 
circuit split, it provides a perfect case study when comparing it to 
the lower court’s decision.224 Specifically, as the First Circuit 
ultimately rejected the district court’s ruling.225 The cases are 
particularly intriguing because they provide insight into the 
arguments of both sides of the split as applied to the same 
STARS transaction.226 
The factual circumstances of the cases are substantially 
similar to both Salem and Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. United 
States227 (BNY), concerning a STARS transaction in which the 
taxpayer—in this case Santander Holdings Corp., formerly 
known as Sovereign228—entered into with Barclays Bank PLC in 
the UK.229 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the foreign 
                                                                                                                 
that because foreign taxes were a prerequisite to the foreign tax credits, they 
should be excluded). 
 223. See generally Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 
15 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 224. See generally Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 
144 F. Supp. 3d 239 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 225. Compare Santander, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41 (rejecting the claim 
that foreign taxes paid are tax effects and that they should be included in 
calculating pre-tax revenue), with Santander, 844 F.3d at 21–26 (reversing the 
district court decision and agreeing with the analysis of the Federal and Second 
Circuit, namely that foreign income taxes paid should not be include in the 
calculation of pre-tax profits). 
 226. Supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text. 
 227. 801 F.3d 104, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 228. See Santander, 844 F.3d at 17 (having acquired Sovereign, Santander 
became the plaintiff in this line of cases). 
 229. See generally Santander, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 240. At this point, it is not 
necessary to repeat the simplified structure of STARS transactions once again. 
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tax credit that resulted in “$234 million in [additional] federal 
income taxes, penalties, and interest . . . for the tax years 2003, 
2004, and 2005.”230 
Beginning its analysis with the objective prong of the 
economic substance doctrine, the district court focused on 
“whether the ‘Barclays payment’ (also known as the ‘[B]x 
payment’) should be accounted for as revenue to Sovereign in 
assessing whether Sovereign had a reasonable prospect of profit 
in what the parties refer to as the ‘trust transaction.’”231 The 
court “agreed with Sovereign that the Barclays payment should 
be accounted for as pretax revenue, which meant that the trust 
transaction showed a reasonable prospect of profit and therefore 
did not, as the government had argued, lack economic 
substance.”232  
The district court split its analysis into two sections: the loan 
portion of the STARS transactions and the trust portion of the 
STARS transactions.233 In terms of the loan, the court concluded 
that even though the loan was above market rate, this did not 
mean it lacked economic substance.234 
Turning to the trust transaction, the district court rejected 
the claim that the transaction lacked economic substance.235 The 
court’s reasoning relied primarily on the fact that the assets that 
Santander placed into the trust “were earning income and 
Sovereign was being taxed on that income before the STARS 
transaction.”236 Additionally, the court noted that Santander’s 
                                                                                                                 
For the essential components of STARS, see supra notes 152–174 and 
accompanying text. 
 230. Santander, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 240. 
 231. Id. at 241. 
 232. See id. (rejecting specifically the argument “that the Barclays payment 
should be treated as an ‘effective rebate’ of U.K. taxes paid by Sovereign and 
thus a ‘tax effect’ that should not be taken into account in determining 
Sovereign’s pretax revenues from the trust transaction and consequently the 
transaction’s prospect of profit”). 
 233. Id. at 241–44. 
 234. See id. at 241–42 (“[The loan] furnished the bank with capital to invest 
in its business that had to be paid back.”). 
 235. See id. at 242 (following the same reasoning as the IES and Compaq 
courts, but noting that the tax payments, unlike the STARS transaction at issue 
here, were the result of arbitrage transactions). 
 236. Id. 
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contribution of assets to the trust did not have any economic 
effects on the income, but instead was purely a jurisdictional 
issue.237 Specifically, the court rejected the government’s claim 
that “the whole point of the purported tax avoidance scheme was 
to generate an undeserved foreign tax credit and thus to avoid 
paying a certain amount in taxes to Uncle Sam by paying an 
equal amount to John Bull.”238 
The court’s final point on the objective prong of the economic 
substance doctrine originated from the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Compaq.239 The court ruled that it would be stacking the deck 
against the taxpayer to agree with “the government’s bootstrap 
position . . . that the tax payment should be included and the tax 
credit excluded because if that is done, the transaction appears to 
lack economic substance.”240 
The First Circuit did not share the district court’s view on 
Santander’s STARS transaction.241 Focusing solely on the issue of 
the economic substance of the trust transaction, the First Circuit 
“agree[d] with the reasoning of the Federal Circuit opinion in 
Salem in rejecting the claims that the Trust transaction had 
economic substance . . . substantially rely[ing] on its analysis.”242 
The court noted that it was not necessary to address the nature of 
the Bx payments, as the trust transaction had no reasonable 
prospect for profit without taking into account the expected 
foreign tax credits.243 Specifically “[t]he Trust transaction is 
profitless because the ‘profit’ to Sovereign from the Bx payment 
comes at the expense of exposure to double the Bx payment’s 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See id. at 243 (“What was changed was that Sovereign was paying 
taxes on the income from the contributed assets to the U.K. rather than to the 
U.S.”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. See id. (referring to the view that if courts view foreign taxes paid as 
expenses for the purposes of calculating pre-tax profits, they should also 
“consider the effect of the offsetting of U.S. foreign tax credit[s]”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 23–26 
(1st Cir. 2016) (reversing the district court’s decision and following the 
reasoning of Salem and BNY). 
 242. Id. at 19. 
 243. See id. at 23 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit that the STARS trust 
transactions were “shaped solely by tax-avoidance features” (quoting Salem 
Financial, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 2015))). 
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value in U.K. taxes.”244 Finally, the First Circuit addressed the 
district court’s “stack the deck” argument, stating that the 
economic reality of a transaction does not depend on whether “the 
transactions produced a net gain to the taxpayer after taking 
both the foreign taxes and the foreign tax credit into account.”245 
The court reasoned that taxpayers are only willing to enter into 
tax shelter transaction at all because they produce a benefit 
which taxpayers derive from the corresponding tax effects.246 
The two preceding cases provide a perfect illustration for the 
need of a definitive resolution of the question of how foreign 
income taxes should be treated for the purpose of pre-tax profits. 
The district court’s approach to the STARS transactions, and 
similarly the objective prong of the economic substance test, is 
fundamentally different to the alternative approach the First 
Circuit advances.247 The district court’s ruling that the trust 
transaction had economic substance because the underlying 
assets themselves were substantive is fundamentally flawed, as it 
disregards the altered use of the assets.248 However, narrowing 
its focus to this limited aspect of the trust transaction, the court 
disregarded the other parts of the trust that solely created tax 
benefits.  
This conceptual dichotomy illustrates the need for uniform 
application and clarification of the objective prong of the economic 
substance doctrine. This is especially true considering the recent 
district court cases under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit. 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at 24. 
 245. Id. at 26 (quoting Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 
948 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 246. See id. (“[B]ecause all tax shelter transactions produce a gain for the 
taxpayer after the tax effects are taken into account—that is why taxpayers are 
willing to enter into them and to pay substantial fees to the promoters.” (quoting 
Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 247. Compare supra notes 231–240 and accompanying text, with supra notes 
242–244 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 3d 
239, 241–42 (D. Mass. 2015) (basing its argument on the fact that because the 
assets were part of substantive transactions before the contribution to the trust, 
they are therefore inevitably substantive under the trust as well). 
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B. Federal District Court of Minnesota: 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States 
One of the most recent district court decision stems from the 
District Court of Minnesota in Wells Fargo & Co. v. United 
States,249 under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit. In Wells 
Fargo, the district court ruled on a motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that the STARS transaction at issue likely 
lacked economic substance.250 
Like the transactions in Salem, BNY, and Santander, this 
case concerned the tax treatment of STARS transactions.251 While 
the transactions in this case occurred between Wells Fargo and 
Barclays, the mechanics of the STARS transactions are virtually 
identical to the other STARS cases previously discussed.252  
To review the STARS transaction, the district court, in 
substance, applied the economic substance doctrine, beginning 
with the objective inquiry.253 As a preliminary matter, the court 
noted that when applying the economic substance doctrine “the 
transactions must be viewed as a whole”254 and that Wells Fargo 
had the burden of proof to show that the transaction was “not a 
sham.”255  
Beginning with the objective prong of the economic substance 
doctrine, the court examined whether there was a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 249. 143 F. Supp. 3d 827 (D. Minn. 2015).  
 250. See id. at 842–46 (relying primarily on the reasoning of the Federal and 
Second Circuits, agreeing that foreign income taxes should be treated as 
expenses for purposes of calculating pre-tax profits under the objective prong of 
the economic substance doctrine). 
 251. Id. at 830. 
 252. See id. at 830–34 (using the same example as the Federal Circuit in 
Salem to describe the elements of STARS); supra notes 154–174, 197–206 and 
accompanying text (referring to the STARS transactions at issue in the 
foregoing cases). 
 253. See Wells Fargo, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 834–46 (referring to the doctrine 
formally as the “sham-transaction doctrine,” but relying chiefly on the courts in 
Salem and BNY, which applied the economic substance doctrine).  
 254. Id. at 834 (quoting IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 356 
(8th Cir. 2001)). 
 255. See id. (stating that claiming a tax deduction brings with it the burden 
of proving that the transaction has economic substance (citing Coltec Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). 
1206 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1171 (2018) 
possibility of profit, focusing on the Bx payment first.256 Wells 
Fargo argued that the Bx payment should be considered pretax 
income, because it was paid from one private party to another as 
compensation for services rendered.257 Additionally, Wells Fargo 
argued that “Barclays’ obligation to make the Bx payment was 
not contingent on Barclays’ realization of tax benefits from the 
STARS transaction,” and thus did not constitute a tax benefit or 
partial rebate.258 While the court acknowledged some merit to the 
argument, it was ultimately not persuaded.259 Relying on the 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Salem, the court stated that “[t]he 
Bx payment . . . does not represent profit from any business 
activity; it is simply the means by which Barclays and BB&T 
shared the tax benefits of the Trust transaction.”260 In other 
words, “the Bx payment was not pretax revenue to Wells Fargo, 
but instead Wells Fargo’s ‘cut’ of the tax benefits generated by 
the STARS transaction.”261  
One of Wells Fargo’s additional arguments is that the STARS 
transactions, as a whole, had economic substance, because the 
loan portion of the STARS transactions generated 
tax-independent profits.262 While the district court agreed with 
Wells Fargo that the loan itself likely resulted in pre-tax revenue, 
it only did so “when viewed in isolation.”263 Rather, the court 
declined to rule “as a matter of law that, because the loan had 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See id. (“The characterization of the Bx payment is important to the 
resolution of this [issue].” (quoting Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States, 786 
F.3d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2015))). 
 257. See id. at 835 (“In Wells Fargo’s view, the Bx payment that it received 
from Barclays is no different (for tax purposes) than, say, the payments that 
Barclays’ attorneys or accountants received for their work on the STARS 
transaction.”).  
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 835–36 (noting that, even though the Bx payment was 
consideration in exchange for Wells Fargo subjecting its assets to U.K. taxation, 
it “lacked any economic substance whatsoever”). 
 260. Id. at 836. 
 261. Id. at 837. 
 262. Id. at 842 (“Wells Fargo argues, it had a reasonable expectation of 
pretax profit because Wells Fargo’s anticipated (and actual) return on capital in 
the ordinary course of its banking operations during the five-year period of the 
loan exceeded 5.8 percent.”). 
 263. Id. at 843. 
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economic substance, the loan imbued the entire STARS 
transaction with economic substance.”264  
Ultimately, the court concluded that Wells Fargo’s motions 
for partial summary judgment should not be granted.265 
Finally, it is important to note that the Federal and Second 
Circuits squarely addressed the issue of whether foreign taxes 
should be treated as expenses for calculating pre-tax profits. One 
explanation may be that while the District Court of Minnesota 
falls under the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction, the court followed 
the Federal and Second Circuits’ reasoning, putting it at odds 
with the Eighth Circuit on the issue. At the moment of writing 
this Note, the case has not completed trial. Thus, the issue might 
still become an element of the final judgment. Regardless, the 
case shows that the issue is far from settled. 
V. Recommended Approach to the Objective Test of the Economic 
Substance Doctrine 
From a financial standpoint, much is on the line for both 
taxpayers and the government.266 The longer the circuit split 
exists, the longer the uncertainty exists for both parties. Thus, a 
resolution is essential, and in order to achieve the correct result, 
the split should be resolved in favor of the Federal and Second 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Id. 
 265. See id. at 853 (“[T]he Court has disagreed with the special master and 
has held that the characterization of the Bx payment must await trial.”). The 
court came to the same conclusion regarding the subjective—business purpose—
prong of the economic substance doctrine, denying Wells Fargo’s motion for 
partial summary judgment that it had a non-tax business purpose. See id. at 
845 (“[E]ven if the trust is considered to be part of the same transaction as the 
loan, and even if the jury finds that the integrated STARS transaction had 
economic substance, the jury might find that the integrated STARS transaction 
lacked a business purpose.”). 
 266. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. United States, 801 F.3d 104, 104 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (concerning a combined tax deficiency of $521.1 million for AIG and 
BNY); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(disallowing $498.1 million in foreign tax credits); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying Compaq foreign tax credits 
in the amount of $3.4 million); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 
(8th Cir. 2001) (“[IES c]laimed a foreign tax credit on the ADR dividends for the 
amount of foreign tax withheld and paid to foreign governments, over $13.5 
million.”). 
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Circuits’ approach. In other words, foreign taxes should be 
treated as expenses for the purposes of determining whether the 
taxpayer had a reasonable possibility of profit under the objective 
prong of the economic substance doctrine. 
A. The Federal and Second Circuits’ Approach Is Preferable 
The U.S. foreign tax credit regime aims “to mitigate the evil 
of double taxation.”267 As foreign investment “can result in double 
taxation of a U.S. taxpayer’s income earned abroad—by the 
country in which it was earned as well as the United States—
Congress crafted the ‘foreign tax credit’ regime.”268 The regime 
served to alleviate the burden of doing business in foreign 
countries, and “was intended to facilitate business abroad and 
foreign trade.”269 However, it was not intended to provide the sole 
basis for profit to taxpayers.270 Thus, when determining a 
reasonable expectation for profit, the only sensible approach is to 
exclude foreign tax credits from that determination, as they are 
tax benefits and do not have an economic character. 
Under this approach, the next logical step is to treat foreign 
income taxes paid as expenses, rather than include them as 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Burnet v. Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). For more information 
on foreign tax credits, see generally Bradley J. Tate, Foreign Tax Credit Basics, 
AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/ 
publications/the_101_201_practice_series/foreign_tax_credit_basics.html (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); ZM 
Ishmurzina, What Is Foreign Tax Credit? Ultimate Guide for US Taxpayers and 
Expats, ARTIO PARTNERS, https://www.artiopartners.com/blog/foreign-tax-credit-
guide-expats-abroad/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Foreign Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/ international-taxpayers/foreign-tax-credit (last 
updated Dec. 16, 2016) (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Foreign Tax Credit, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreign-tax-credit.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 
2017) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 268. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107. 
 269. See id. (“We would discourage men from going out after commerce and 
business in different countries . . . if we maintained this double taxation.” (citing 
56 Cong. Rec. App. 677 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kitchin))). 
 270. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 836 (D. 
Minn. 2015) (emphasizing that tax credits are predicated by actual business, 
and require more than “exploiting differences among foreign tax codes” (quoting 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 113)). 
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profits. Foreign taxes are the very thing that give rise to foreign 
tax credits, and it is illogical to divorce them from tax credits for 
the purposes of calculating pre-tax profits.271 If the objective 
prong of the economic substance doctrine is to provide a 
meaningful analysis into the business reality of a transaction, 
courts should disregard all tax considerations, including foreign 
taxes.272  
Not treating foreign taxes as expenses renders the objective 
prong of the economic substance test toothless, as it would 
include the very item which gives rise to a tax benefit. The 
purpose of the economic substance analysis is “to provide courts a 
‘second look’ to ensure that particular uses of tax benefits comply 
with Congress’s purpose in creating that benefit.”273  
Including foreign taxes in the calculation of pre-tax profits 
would mean that the taxpayer would always obtain the 
corresponding tax benefit, provided the taxpayer contributed 
enough assets to generate a substantial liability. For example, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Salem 
disallowed $498.1 million in foreign tax credits.274 Thus, because 
foreign tax credits are a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of 
foreign taxes paid, it can be inferred that the taxpayer in Salem 
paid $498.1 million in foreign taxes.275 If the court had included 
these foreign taxes paid in its determination of whether the 
taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of profits, the taxpayer 
would inevitably fulfill this requirement, as this amount is—by 
any standard—substantial. This would defeat the purpose of the 
                                                                                                                 
 271. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text (concluding that it is 
appropriate to consider the effect of foreign taxes, but not the corresponding 
credit in assessing pre-tax profit). 
 272. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. United States, 658 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “even if a transaction’s form matches the dictionary definitions of 
each term used in the statutory definition of the tax provision, it does not follow 
that Congress meant to cover such a transaction and allow it a tax benefit”). 
 273. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 113. 
 274. Supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Ronald A. Worley, The Indirect Foreign Tax Credit: A Policy 
Analysis of Section 902, 13 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 176, 178 (1996) (“A tax credit 
is a dollar for dollar reduction to taxes owed and, therefore, the foreign tax 
credit generally has the effect of treating foreign taxes (on foreign source 
income) as a ‘down payment’ on the taxpayers’ U.S. tax liability.”). 
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objective prong of the economic substance doctrine, as it 
incentivizes sham transactions such as STARS.276 
The Fifth Circuit in Compaq concluded that “[t]o count 
[foreign taxes paid] only when they subtract from cash flow is to 
stack the deck against finding the transaction profitable.”277 This 
logic is not persuasive. The objective prong of the economic 
substance doctrine is not intended to be an easy way for the 
taxpayer to circumvent this necessarily rigorous inquiry.278 
Disregarding foreign taxes paid does not “stack the deck” against 
the taxpayer, it provides an effective deterrent against taxpayer 
abuses of the tax code. 
Excluding foreign taxes in the determination of profits also 
provides the best approach going forward.279 When it comes to 
transactions such as STARS, “[t]he endless ingenuity of 
taxpayers in attempting to avoid taxes means that there will be a 
first time for everything.”280 In other words, STARS transactions 
will not be method taxpayers use to gain an illegitimate 
advantage of tax benefits. This becomes particularly evident 
when comparing the fairly simple “dividend stripping” 
transactions at issue in IES and Compaq on the one hand, and 
the exceedingly complex STARS transactions in Salem, BNY, 
Santander, and Wells Fargo.281 However, excluding foreign taxes 
from the determination of profits will act as a disincentive for 
                                                                                                                 
 276. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. United States, 801 F.3d 104, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (“Additionally, excluding the economic effect of foreign taxes from the 
pre-tax analysis would fundamentally undermine the point of the economic 
substance inquiry. That point is to remove the challenged tax benefit and 
evaluate whether the relevant transaction makes economic sense.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 277. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 785 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 278. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 118 (“The purpose of 
calculating pre-tax profit in this context is not to perform mere financial 
accounting, subtracting costs from revenue on a spreadsheet: It is to discern, as 
a matter of law, whether a transaction meaningfully alters a taxpayer’s 
economic position other than with respect to tax consequences.”). 
 279. See id. (noting the economic substance doctrine “was born out of 
necessity, as ‘[e]ven the smartest drafters of legislation and regulation cannot be 
expected to anticipate every [tax avoidance] device.’” (quoting ASA Investerings 
P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). 
 280. Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 838 (D. Minn. 
2015). 
 281. Supra notes 121–123, 152–171 and accompanying text. 
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taxpayers to engage in sham transactions, as taxpayers will be on 
notice that the IRS will only take their actual economic profits 
into account when determining the reasonable expectation for 
profits.  
B. The Solution for Resolving the Split 
The final question left to be answered is how the above 
suggestion—to treat foreign taxes paid as expenses for the 
purposes of determining the reasonable expectation of profits 
under the objective prong of the economic substance doctrine—
should be implemented in practice. There are three ways in 
which this can occur. First, § 7701(o)(2)(B) of the Internal 
Revenue Code could be amended to require foreign taxes be 
treated as expenses, eliminating the need for the Secretary of the 
Treasury to promulgate regulations. Second, the Secretary of the 
Treasury could promulgate regulations, as § 7701(o)(2)(B) 
currently allows. Third, the Supreme Court of the United States 
could clarify the doctrine it initially created, providing flexibility 
for lower courts in applying the doctrine. 
Currently, Congress mandates that “fees and other 
transaction expenses” are treated as expenses, while foreign 
taxes require the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate 
regulations for foreign taxes to count as expenses in appropriate 
circumstances.282 The most comprehensive solution would be to 
eliminate this distinction.  
Congress could achieve this by merging foreign taxes into the 
first sentence of § 7701(o)(2)(B) and eliminating the second 
sentence.283 Under this proposal, the new—single sentence—
§ 7701(o)(2)(B) would read: “Fees, foreign taxes, and other 
transaction expenses shall be taken into account as expenses in 
determining pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A).” This would 
provide the most comprehensive solution and ensure uniform 
application throughout the courts.  
An alternative approach to amending § 7701(o)(A)(B), is for 
the Secretary of the Treasury to—in fact—promulgate 
                                                                                                                 
 282. Supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text. 
 283. For the current two sentence structure of § 7701(o)(2)(B), see supra 
note 93 and accompanying text. 
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regulations. As of writing this Note, the Secretary has not 
promulgated any such regulations.284  
While the Secretary has issued a regulation disallowing 
foreign tax credits for STARS transactions, the regulation does 
not address the specific issue of whether foreign taxes should be 
treated as expenses for the calculation of pre-tax profits.285 
Additionally, “the regulation does not purport to resolve the 
circuit splits presented here, which concern issues that affect 
transactions of any form, not just STARS.”286 Thus, the Secretary 
would need to issue regulations which do not merely apply to a 
specific transaction, but rather to certain types of transactions 
which contain common elements. While this approach would 
provide the flexibility for applying the objective prong of the 
economic substance doctrine, as it would be able to apply to a 
wide range of transactions, it would merely be a reactionary 
method of dealing with the ever developing area of sham 
transactions.  
The third option is for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, 
and resolve the circuit split. By means of a narrow holding, the 
Supreme Court should rule that foreign taxes are treated as 
expenses when determining the reasonable expectation of a 
pre-tax profit.  
This approach would immediately resolve the circuit split 
and would provide uniformity in application between the courts. 
This option would also constitute an acceptable option going 
forward, deterring taxpayers from entering into sham 
transactions like STARS.  
Of these three options, the best option is to amend 
§ 7701(o)(A)(B). This option constitutes the most comprehensive 
solution, and would likely pre-empt any future variations 
transactions such as STARS. Additionally, it would create 
uniformity when calculating pre-tax profits for purposes of the 
objective prong of the economic substance doctrine. 
                                                                                                                 
 284. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 103, at 33 n.10 (“That 
regulation applies only prospectively; it does not apply to this case or any other 
pending STARS case.”). 
 286. Id. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The economic substance doctrine is in need of clarification. 
As one of the most long-standing tax doctrines, as well as the 
most prominent one today, a uniform application, particularly 
regarding its objective prong, is crucial. The circuit split between 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits on the one hand, and the Federal, 
Second Circuit, and most recently the First Circuit, on the other, 
has led to considerable confusion and uncertainty for both 
taxpayers and tax authorities. Because of this confusion, 
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign tax credits are at 
stake. 
While the legislative clarification of the economic substance 
doctrine provided some guidance on how to apply the doctrine, it 
did not provide any meaningful guidance regarding foreign 
income taxes. Thus, the stark dichotomy in treatment of foreign 
income taxes for the purposes of calculating pre-tax profits under 
the objective prong of the economic substance doctrine persists.  
To eradicate this confusion, and to achieve the correct 
treatment of foreign income taxes, the Federal and Second 
Circuits’ approach is preferable. To argue that treating foreign 
income taxes as expenses, and excluding foreign tax credits from 
the analysis of pre-tax profits is to “stack the deck” is illogical and 
leads to unintended results. It is impossible to divorce foreign 
income taxes from foreign income tax credits, as the former gives 
rise to the latter. Thus, they are both tax effects, which should 
have no bearing on the determination of actual pre-tax profit.  
Excluding foreign income taxes from the calculation of pre-
tax profits also provides the most consistent interpretation for 
future tax shelter transactions. The evolution from the “ex-
dividend” transactions at issue in IES and Compaq to the highly 
complicated STARS transactions in Salem, BNY, and Santander 
make it reasonable to assume that in the future new, ingenious 
tax shelters will arise, seeking to take advantage of the tax code. 
However, by treating foreign income taxes as expenses for the 
purposes of calculating pre-tax profits, the courts will be able to 
quickly assess the true colors of a transaction. 
As long as this circuit split exists, taxpayers and authorities 
will likely be engaged in lengthy legal battles of tax shelter cases. 
Treating foreign income taxes as expenses for pre-tax profit will 
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provide an effective deterrent for taxpayers to engage in such tax 
arbitrage transactions in the first place.  
Finally, the appropriate solution for resolving the circuit split 
is to amend § 7701(o)(A)(B). This would provide uniformity in 
application of the objective prong of the economic substance 
doctrine, and will significantly dampen the endless ingenuity of 
taxpayers in creating sham transactions. Amending 
§ 7701(o)(A)(B) is the most appropriate solution going forward. In 
the context of these complex cross-border transactions, the 
economic substance doctrine is the gatekeeper to the legitimate 
allowance of foreign tax credits. Specifically, without an effective, 
and uniformly applied, objective prong and treatment of foreign 
taxes as expenses, courts are left with an ineffective deterrent to 
tax shelter shams. With hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
foreign tax credits on the line, it is crucial for courts to be able to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate tax credits. 
